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MORE THAN MERIT: REFRAMING THE DEBATE
OVER EXAMINATION-BASED ADMISSIONS IN
PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Aaron Saiger*
Some selective public schools use entrance examinations, either alone or
in conjunction with other academic measures, to admit students. This
practice often generates student bodies with tiny numbers of Black and
Latino students, numbers dramatically disproportionate to the populations
from which the schools draw. Many voices therefore call for test-based
admissions to be abolished. More broadly, critics argue that, in addition to
being poisonous to equity, “merit” is an incoherent and pernicious category
for public-school admissions.
This Article seeks to expand what has been a narrow debate over selective
admissions. The reasonableness and desirability of academically selective
admissions do not depend solely upon the propriety of rewarding “merit,”
either at all or in the ways that admissions tests define it. There are (at least)
three ways to think about exam schools other than as meritocratic
institutions: as contests not primarily designed to reward; as part of a
strategy of differentiated instruction; and as pork, one among many statecreated goods whose benefits politicians spread across constituencies. The
choice of frame strongly affects the resonance of various arguments
regarding exam schools, including disputes about disparate resources, the
impact of exam-preparation services, and whether exam-school attendance
benefits students.
The propriety of exam schools also depends not only upon the schools
themselves but upon the structure of the school system in which they are
embedded. Exam schools can be more easily justified when they are a part
of a large set of diverse schools with multiple missions.
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INTRODUCTION
A public school admits students based, at least in substantial part, on an
entrance exam. The student body that results looks, with respect to race,
entirely different than the district it serves. Res ipsa loquitur, many say:
Behold a racist admissions policy. Admissions schemes that yield titanically
disparate racial impacts are intolerable.1 Certainly they are unacceptable in
a public school — managed by the state, staffed by government employees,
and funded by tax dollars.
In several high-profile cases across the country, this sort of reasoning has
led to efforts to eliminate public school admissions tests — and then to
backlash. In 2021, school boards in both Boston and Fairfax County,
Virginia, dropped exam scores from the vector of requirements for admission
to their prestigious Boston Latin School and Thomas Jefferson School for
Science and Technology (respectively). Both decisions are being litigated
in federal court.2

1. See, e.g., Alia Wong, The Cutthroat World of Elite Public Schools, ATLANTIC (Dec.
4, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2014/12/the-cutthroat-world-ofelite-public-schools/383382/ [https://perma.cc/RE9B-TY2C] (describing racial differences in
test-school enrollment in New York City as “staggering”).
2. Coal. for TJ v. Fairfax Cty. Sch. Bd., No. 21-296, 2022 WL 986994 (4th Cir. Mar. 31,
2022) (renumbered No. 22-1280), stay entered, 2022 WL 986994 (4th Cir. Mar. 31, 2022);
Bos. Parent Coal. for Acad. Excellence Corp. v. Sch. Comm. of City of Bos., 996 F.3d 37 (1st
Cir. 2021).
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The same year, the San Francisco school board embarked upon what
proved to be an ephemeral experiment at its famed Lowell High School. The
board, citing racial equity, replaced Lowell’s longstanding academic
admissions criteria with a lottery system. This led, in rapid succession, to
litigation, the bitter and very public resignation of Lowell’s principal, the
successful (and even more bitter) recall of several school board members,
and the reinstatement by the newly constituted school board of Lowell’s
original admission process.3
In New York City, meanwhile, exam-only admissions at the City’s eight
“exam schools” — three of which are required to use the exam by state
statute — have been a perennial font of controversy.4 Two of those three
schools, Stuyvesant High School and the Bronx High School of Science,
have in recent years admitted classes where between one and three percent
of students are Black, in a city where one in four public school students is
Black.5 Advocates filed a high-profile complaint with the federal
Department of Education,6 and New York City’s then-Mayor Bill de Blasio
aggressively took on Albany and some angry citizens in an effort to kill the
test.7 Both efforts failed. Test-only admissions continue at Stuyvesant and

3. See Nathan Heller, What Happens When an Élite Public School Becomes Open to
All?, NEW YORKER (Mar. 7, 2022), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/03/14/whathappens-when-an-elite-public-school-becomes-open-to-all [https://perma.cc/R7ML-4558];
Soumya Karlamangla, Following Recall, San Francisco School Board Reverses Course, N.Y.
TIMES (June 24, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/24/us/recall-san-francisco-schoolboard.html [https://perma.cc/7XFU-6SJ8].
4. See Aaron Saiger, Test Unrest, 21 CITYLAW 1 (Jan./Feb. 2015).
5. See id.; see also Michelle Bocanegra, Black, Latino Students Again Admitted to Elite
NYC High Schools at Disproportionately Low Rates, GOTHAMIST (June 15, 2022),
https://gothamist.com/news/black-latino-students-again-admitted-to-elite-nyc-high-schoolsat-disproportionately-low-rates [https://perma.cc/KBT8-GFZH] (reporting that, in the 2022
admissions cycle, Black and Latino students in New York City were extended offers to attend
the City’s test schools at rates an order of magnitude smaller than their representation among
those who sat for the admissions exam).
6. See Letter from Debo P. Adegbile et al., NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, to the
N.Y. Off., Off. For Civ. Rts., U.S. Dep’t of Educ. 15–16 (Sept. 27, 2012),
https://www.naacpldf.org/wp-content/uploads/Specialized-High-Schools-Complaint.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QGH3-V29A]. A similar filing was made regarding the Thomas Jefferson
School in Fairfax in 2012. Janel George, The Myth of Merit: The Fight of the Fairfax County
School Board and the New Front of Massive Resistance, 49 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1091, 1092
(2022).
7. See Priscilla A. Consolo, A Single Score No More: Rethinking the Admissions System
for New York City’s Specialized High Schools to Preserve Academic Excellence and Promote
Student Diversity, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1244, 1254 (2019).
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its sister New York schools,8 with the (hedged) support of de Blasio’s
successor9 and the chastened acquiescence of other local elected officials.10
Educational regulators in New York have simultaneously undertaken a
“sweeping” repudiation of the de Blasio push to abolish the use of any
academic measures for admission across the public school system; many
City schools other than the exam schools had used not a single examination
but a range of academic criteria to make their admissions decisions.11 Such
academic “screens” have been restored to their central role in those schools’
admissions practices as well.12
The litigation in Boston and Virginia, the electoral recall and policy
reversal in San Francisco, and the ongoing battles in New York suggest that
the thing does not speak for itself. Test-based admissions (again, using “testbased” also to describe admissions schemes that use tests in conjunction with
other academic measures) have found considerable political and intellectual
support. Efforts to do away with them have met with stalwart and often
effective resistance, including high profile political campaigns. As in the
higher-education cases now before the Supreme Court, some Asian
Americans have taken a leading role in wondering why systems that benefit
their success should be understood to be racial problems, rather than racial
victories.13 The tests, they and others argue, are the same for everyone. They
benefit the diligent and the brilliant. And aren’t grit, intelligence, and
accomplishment — often lumped together as “merit” — things that we, as a
society, need, value, and want to encourage?14
For social and educational critics who view the exam schools through the
prism of racism and anti-racism — among whom one finds many legal
advocates who view the issue exclusively in terms of federal constitutional
8. See Vinay Harpalani, Testing the Limits: Asian Americans and the Debate Over
Standardized Entrance Exams, 73 S.C. L. REV. 759, 776, 778 (2022); Consolo, supra note 7,
at 1254; Ginia Bellafante, Bill de Blasio Knows He Isn’t Loved, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/27/nyregion/bill-de-blasio-congress.html
[https://perma.cc/VK4B-BEF2].
9. See Bocanegra, supra note 5.
10. See Cayla Bamberger, New NYC Council Bills Intend to Widen Access to Elite Public
High Schools, N.Y. POST (June 15, 2022, 9:29 PM), https://nypost.com/2022/06/15/new-nyccouncil-bills-would-widen-access-to-elite-public-high-schools/
[https://perma.cc/PD4KPYEH] (reporting the introduction of reform proposals in the New York City Council that are
consistent with retention of the admissions examination in the test-only schools).
11. Troy Closson, In a Reversal, New York City Tightens Admissions to Some Top
Schools, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/29/nyregion/nycschools-admissions.html; see also infra notes 138–47 and accompanying text.
12. Id.
13. See Harpalani, supra note 8, at 760–61, 770–71; Asra Q. Nomani, School is for Merit,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/01/opinion/us-schoolmerit.html [https://perma.cc/K96S-XHNU]; Closson, supra note 11.
14. See, e.g., Nomani, supra note 13.
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and civil rights law — the answer to this question is that the answer does not
much matter. Test-based admission is formally neutral — it is not a facially
racial criterion — but creates deeply disparate impacts.15 There can be no
claim that the state has a compelling interest in sponsoring elite public
schools; plenty of jurisdictions get along fine without them.16 So the only
legal question is the perennial one of how to analyze disparate impact. If the
law of equality should reject practices that have disparate impacts without
compelling justification, test-based admissions ought to fall. If it should
confine itself to blocking only practices that impose facial racial criteria or
that are animated by racial animus, the schools are lawful.
This analysis is inadequate because the framing of the question is itself
inadequate. The test schools do not pose only questions under federal civil
rights law. States bear a positive duty to educate all children.17 They have
concomitant leeway to structure the schools they provide — a massive
government expenditure18 — in line with their citizens’ preferences.19 No
such system can require zero disparate impact, and certainly not one
structured by our educational federalism. Therefore, neither the societal
debate nor the legal debate over exam schools has been, or should be, only
about disparate impact. It is also necessarily one about educational policy:
Is the public preference for exam schools, as realized through the actions of

15. See Harpalani, supra note 8, at 776.
16. Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 355–56 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating
that defendant “Law School seeks to improve marginally the education it offers without
sacrificing too much of its exclusivity and elite status”). Justice Scalia pressed this point at
the oral argument in Grutter, suggesting with respect to race-based affirmative action at
University of Michigan’s Law School that:
[T]he problem is a problem of Michigan’s own creation, that is to say, it has
decided to create an elite law school, it is one of the best law schools in the
country . . . [I]f Michigan really cares enough about that racial imbalance, why
doesn’t it do as many other State law schools do, lower the standards, not have
a flagship elite law school, it solves the problem[?] . . . If [racial diversity is]
important enough to override the Constitution’s prohibition of racial
distribution, it seems to me it’s important enough to override Michigan’s desire
to have a super-duper law school?
Transcript of Oral Argument at 30–31, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
17. See Joshua E. Weishart, Reconstituting the Right to Education, 67 ALA. L. REV. 915,
936 (2016).
18. See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS., ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY PUBLIC SCHOOL
EXPENDITURES AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (2022),
https://ncses.nsf.gov/indicators/states/indicator/public-school-expenditures-to-state-gdp
[https://perma.cc/7DTY-X6RQ] (reporting that the United States spent 3.1% of its gross
national product on pre-K–12 education in 2018).
19. This makes the debate over selective public school admissions quite different in kind
from the debate over racial preferences in higher education, which is an elective service that
government need not provide at all. See supra note 16.
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elected officials, important enough, or plausible enough, to justify the
disparate impact that it causes?
This debate is usually framed as a clash between racial fairness and
educational “meritocracy.”20 This frame is too narrow. This Article seeks
to expand it, in two ways. First, it argues that the reasonableness or
desirability of academically selective schools does not depend only on
whether it is proper to reward “merit,” either at all or in the ways that
admissions tests define it, given disparate impact. It suggests that, in
addition to considering selective public school admissions as academic
rewards, there are (at least) three other ways to think about them. They might
be public contests, not primarily designed to reward. They might be a project
of differentiated instruction, an effort to provide a learning environment to a
particular kind of student that will best serve their educational needs. And
they might be pork, one non-public good among many that politicians spread
around favored constituencies for political reasons.
These possibilities lead to the Article’s second argument: The normative
appeal of test-based admissions policies depends not only on the policies
themselves but upon the structure of the entire local school system in which
the test school is embedded. A system that has special schools for strong
test-takers but offers no corresponding kinds of programs for other kinds of
students must meet a higher standard of justification than a system with
programs that select for a wide range of needs and attributes. The analysis
draws upon the concept of “second-order diversity,” introduced by Heather
Gerken in 2004, to develop these claims.21
Part I of the Article makes some brief introductory remarks regarding
what is (or should be) a consensus about structural racism and geographybased school assignment. Part II then develops the framing argument, and
Part III the argument about second-order diversity.
I. SOME POINTS OF AGREEMENT
Two propositions about the exam schools, and the racial
unrepresentativeness of the populations they serve, are not controversial —
or at least should not be, among reasonable people.
First, everyone should agree that the racially skewed results of admissions
by test are evidence of serious racial problems in American education.

20. See generally Richard R. Buery, Jr., Public School Admissions and the Myth of
Meritocracy: How and Why Screened Public School Admissions Promote Segregation,
N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 101 (Apr. 2020) (arguing that by directly confronting the myth of
meritocracy, there can be meaningful progress towards expanding educational opportunity for
all).
21. Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099, 1101 (2004).
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Reasonable people can disagree about what kind of problem the evidence
suggests. Some will see evidence of bad tests, skewed notion of merit, and
an obstinate willingness of society to double down on the consequences of
structural racism.22 Others, comfortable with the tests and the importance of
what they measure, will see evidence of underlying social and structural
disparities that lead to racial variability in academic performance and that
need amelioration.23 Controversy swirls over which of these two groups has
the better account of the problem. But reasonable people cannot look at the
results of admission by testing and see no problem at all.
Second, school assignment by test is undeniably better policy than school
assignment by geography — which is the modal method of student
assignment in use in the United States. Every criticism of testing — that it
does not predict success, that it does not measure merit, that it
misunderstands merit, that it tests for the wrong things, that it is racially and
culturally biased, that it magnifies the advantages of wealth — applies a
fortiori to the geographical assignment of students to schools. To whatever
extent testing is a poor measure of potential, merit, knowledge, or desert,
geography is a worse measure. To whatever extent testing disadvantages
particular racial or cultural groups, the educational costs that America’s
segregated housing system imposes upon such groups are orders of
magnitude larger.24 The wealth that allows some but not all to purchase testpreparation services or tutors, buying advantage for their children, is dwarfed
by the wealth required to access schools in a wealthy part of town by buying
or renting a home there, and the advantages that flow from doing so.25
Indeed, a good part of the test-school concept is to ameliorate the racial
and class barriers that arise from geographical student assignment in an
environment of segregated housing. The test is in that sense a leveler.26
22. See Heller, supra note 3, at 4 (San Francisco school board understood the racial
demographics of Lowell to demonstrate “some hidden bias [that] was being amplified by its
supposedly meritocratic admissions”).
23. See, e.g., Kathryn Paige Harden, The SAT Isn’t What’s Unfair, ATLANTIC (Apr. 2,
2022), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/04/mit-admissions-reinstates-sat-acttests/6219455/ [https://perma.cc/4VSA-B5PV] (“The test measures differences in academic
preparedness, including the ability to write a clear sentence, to understand a complex passage,
and to solve a mathematical problem. [It] doesn’t create inequalities in these academic skills.
It reveals them.”).
24. See. e.g., Buery, supra note 20, at 102; see also LaToya Baldwin Clark, Barbed Wire
Fences: The Structural Violence of Education Law, 89 U. CHI. L. REV. 499, 511 (2022) (“the
coconstitutive forces of residential segregation and school segregation . . . reinforce each
other”); Osamudia James, Superior Status: Relational Obstacles in the Law to Racial Justice
and LGBTQ Equality, 63 B.C. L. REV. 199, 209 (2022).
25. See Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Joshua Angrist & Parag Pathak, The Elite Illusion:
Achievement Effects at Boston and New York Exam Schools, 82 ECONOMETRICA 137, 138
(2014).
26. See Harden, supra note 23.
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Many (not all) poor students can and do take the test, and some succeed.
Even if the correlation of high scores with privilege in general or preparation
in particular is significant and substantial, it is less than one. And some of
the drivers of that correlation can be ameliorated. As will be noted below,
many (not all) families for whom a wealthy neighborhood is utterly out of
reach can, with effort, scrape together funds to pay for test preparation.27
Geographic assignment to schools — the localism of American education
— is, on the other hand, the driver of racial segregation in American schools,
dwarfing admission by examination or any similar policies by orders of
magnitude. Most racial segregation is among districts, while exam-school
controversies all arise in the context of intra-district choice programs.
Because the Supreme Court many decades ago put the kibosh on judicial
enforcement of remedies for inter-district racial segregation that is not de
jure,28 lawyers and advocates have by necessity come to focus on intradistrict policy as a second-best option. But this should not disguise the fact
that the two primary institutions that generate educational segregation are
housing segregation and educational localism.29 Moreover, in districts that
have substantial intradistrict housing segregation, geographic assignment to
schools within the district is also pernicious, in ways that admission by test
would be expected usually to ameliorate and rarely to make significantly
worse.30 Whether it ameliorates them sufficiently and in the right way is,
again, the source of legitimate controversy. But that controversy arises in
the context of a system characterized by geographical assignment that is
fundamentally unjustifiable.
II. COMPETING FRAMES FOR THE EXAM SCHOOL
A defining characteristic of the public and lawyerly conversation about
exam schools is its interlocutors’ inconsistent and often unstated
understandings of what these schools are for. There are four frames through
which the exam-school project can be understood. Exam schools can be
thought of as state-sponsored contests or competitions, as efforts to reward
“merit,” as a pedagogical strategy, and as an exercise in pork-barrel politics.
These frames are not entirely discrete, nor are they mutually exclusive, but
they are broadly incompatible with one another. Which of them prevails, or
where on the spectrum of hybrid conceptions one places the exam schools,

27. See infra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
28. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744–45 (1974).
29. See Aaron J. Saiger, The School District Boundary Problem, 42 URB. LAW. 493, 500–
06 (2010).
30. See Kendra Taylor & Erica Frankenberg, Student Assignment Policies and Racial and
Income Segregation of Schools, School Attendance Zones, and Neighborhoods, 57 EDUC.
ADMIN. Q. 747, 752–53 (2021).
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determines in large measure how one understands the schools’ value,
assesses objections to the racial and other unfairnesses they generate, and
contemplates reform.
A. Exam Schools as State-Sponsored Contests
One way to see exam schools is as state-sponsored competitions. The
exam is the contest and enrollment in the school the prize. In this frame,
admission to the exam school is like the trophy in the school district spelling
bee, or the blue ribbon at a county fair. The prize has little or no intrinsic
value. What matters is the competition. The ribbon is just a ribbon. Gilded
trophies are abundant and cheap online. They are valuable only insofar as
they symbolize winning the contest. If the ribbon turns out to be flimsy, or
a substitute trophy is awarded because the first one shattered, we do not
expect complaints, because the real justification is the competition itself.
State-sponsored contests do demand a certain kind of fairness. Procedures
for judging must be transparent and unbiased with respect to the identity of
the winner. You cannot skew the best-pie award towards the county
executive’s kid, or feed the answers to a cheating speller. But the frame of
the contest does not require that the contest further some urgent and clearly
defined public goal, or that the criteria for winning be objectively specified,
or that one be able to justify why the state should organize it in one particular
way as opposed to some other. There is little government interest in
nurturing star spellers; the standards for what makes a prize pig can be
qualitative and idiosyncratic, so long as evenly applied; and no general
benefit accrues from the most delicious pie (which the judges and the baker,
and perhaps the baker’s family, consume on their own). A speller or baker
who loses their contest will find little sympathy for demands that the criteria
for judging be fully and neutrally explicated, or that the contest be reworked
to reward something else. Like games and sports, the rational basis for
contests is the process of contestation, not that the contest reward something
that reasonable people care about.31
Governments are clearly entitled to sponsor such competitions. Rational
basis is the right test, and it allows state activities that are unnecessary and
31. See JAMES MAGUIRE, AMERICAN BEE 56 (2006) (“By the early 1800s the spelling
match became a social event. Having no television, apple-cheeked students trooped to the
schoolhouse on winter evenings for a high-spirited spelling bee. The emphasis was on fun
rather than orthographic rigor.”); id. at 62–64 (national fad for spelling matches in the 1870s);
H.W. Mumford, Report of Committee on Prize Competitions, 1 J. HEREDITY 138, 144 (1909)
(arguing that “the educational features of prize competitions” and the competitions’ “appeal
to the young” advance agricultural education); Allen Walker Read, The Spelling Bee: A
Linguistic Institution of the American Folk, 56 PMLA 495, 500, 502–04, 509, 510 (1941)
(describing the spelling bee variously as a “for[m] of entertainment,” an “amusement,” and a
“social event” in nineteenth-century American communities).
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even frivolous. Only egregious unfairnesses — a spelling bee or the fair that
discriminated against racial or gender minorities, or one where bribes and
favors were exchanged for victory — would lead a court to act.
Moreover, the spelling bee and county fair are not frivolous. They create
incentives to participate and try to win.32 This makes the frame of the contest
particularly appealing when thinking about the exam school. While the state
has no special interest in identifying the best pie or the finest hog in the
county, it does have an interest in nurturing skill in the domestic sciences
and animal husbandry.33 The recondite skills of the top spellers who win
contemporary spelling bees are of actual use to no one, but there is a genuine
state interest in encouraging kids to study their spelling words.34 Of sciencefair experiments that take top honors, only one in a million is a breakthrough
in its field —but competing for those honors gives numerous children
“experience [of] the practices of science.”35 Likewise, staging a contest of

32. As Georg Simmel writes:
The runner who wants to make his mark merely through his speed, the
merchant who wants to be effective merely by means of the price of his wares,
the missionary who wants to have results only through the intrinsic power of
conviction of his teachings, are all examples of this strange type of struggle,
which is equal to any other type in the intensity and passionate mobilization of
all available energies; which is, moreover, maximized in the direction of
utmost performance merely by the mutual awareness of the opponent’s
performance; and yet, if observed from the outside, seems to proceed as if there
were no adversary present in this world, but merely the goal.
Georg Simmel, Sociology of Competition, 33 CANADIAN J. SOCIO./CAHIERS CANADIENS DE
SOCIOLOGIE 957, 959 (2008). There does not, however, appear to be empirical support in the
social-psychology literature for the claim that competition creates desirable incentives. See,
e.g., Brynne C. DiMenichi & Elizabeth Tricomi, The Power of Competition: Effects of Social
Motivation on Attention, Sustained Physical Effort, and Learning, 6 FRONTIERS PSYCH., Sept.
2015, at 1, 1–2. Studies of science fairs reach mixed conclusions regarding whether
competition creates incentives for participation. See Frederick Grinnell, Reinventing Science
Fairs, 36 ISSUES SCI. & TECH, Spring 2020, at 23–24 (2020) (“[T]he competitive aspect can
be positive or negative depending on the student’s personality . . . .”); Giuliano Reis, Liliane
Dionne & Louis Trudel, Sources of Anxiety and the Meaning of Participation in/for Science
Fairs: A Canadian Case, 15 CANADIAN J. SCI, MATHEMATICS & TECH. EDUC. 32, 34 (2015)
(“Although competition associated with the possibility of praise and winning may undermine
students’ personal satisfaction for the challenges of individual or collaborative problem
solving, it can also be a potential motivation factor for participation.”).
33. See Mumford, supra note 31, at 139 (positing that agricultural contests at county fairs
“have been instrumental in doing much good in arousing public sentiment in favor of good
seeds and have been the means of making our county fairs of a more educational character.”).
34. See MAGUIRE, supra note 31, at 56 (earliest spelling bees in American culture were
classroom activities); id. at 65 (after the 1870s “the bee as educational method kept gaining
momentum); Read, supra note 31, at 509, 511 (“In the first half of the nineteenth century,
spelling bees developed naturally to meet an educational need felt by the populace”).
35. Grinnell, supra note 32, at 23; see also Tammy V. Abernathy & Richard N. Vineyard,
Academic Competitions in Science: What Are the Rewards for Students?, 74 CLEARING HOUSE
269, 269 (2001).
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academic merit leads kids to hit the books, even if nobody cares, or nobody
reasonable cares, about the differences between the winner and the third
runner-up. The state interest is served by the fact of the contest; having
prizes for the winner is a method by which the state draws people in to
compete.36
B. Exam Schools as “Meritocratic” Prizes
A related but ultimately very different way of understanding the exam
school is that it is a prize or reward. This view shares with the county-fair
perspective the views that the admissions examination is a contest, and that
drawing people to compete in an activity that has social benefits — studying
for the exam — is a social good. But it understands the prize not only as a
means for promoting the contest, but also as a reward for the deserving. It
matters not just that you try hard to bake a good pie but that your pie is the
best pie; not just that you study your spelling but that you be able to spell
“bougainvillea” or “pendeloque.”37 Merit deserves reward.38
Opponents of exam schools are operating within this frame when they
argue that merit does not deserve reward, especially from the government
and especially where children are concerned.39 The right to vote, for
example, is given to each adult with equal weight, regardless of their ability
to make sound voting decisions, because each adult is an equal citizen.40

36. See Simmel, supra note 32, at 960 (“Competition results in added value because from
the perspective of the group, subjective motives and means are employed in order to generate
objective social values; and because from the perspective of the competing party, the
generation of something objectively valuable is used as a means to gain subjective
satisfaction.”); Dael Wolfe, Science Fairs, 140 SCI. 1055, 1055 (1963) (“Children are plastic
and quite responsive to the rewards offered them; let us therefore give careful attention to the
prizes . . . . Rewards can be used to encourage attainment of the excellent objectives of science
fairs and to discourage the objectionable features.”).
37. Mark Abadi, The National Spelling Bee Ended With 8 Winners — Here’s the Winning
Word from Every Spelling Bee since 1925, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 7, 2022),
https://www.businessinsider.com/winning-words-spelling-bee-1925-2017-5
[https://perma.cc/8E3V-3ZEP].
38. High-level contemporary American science fairs operate predominantly in this frame,
awarding very substantial scholarship and cash prizes to their winners. See Maureen Byoko,
Kid Geniuses: Fame, Fortune, and Science Fairs, JOM: J. MINERALS, METALS & MATERIALS
SOC’Y, Sept. 2004, at 13, 14 (“These contests offer students access to millions of dollars in
scholarships. The largest awards go to the STS and Siemens Westinghouse winners, at
$100,000. For the International Science and Engineering Fair (ISEF), the three top winners
receive the Intel Foundation Young Scientist Award of $50,000.”).
39. See Buery, supra note 20, at 114–15 (noting that “merit” is a meaningless concept
until “after all children in America receive a truly excellent education, with the emotional,
economic, and social supports that all humans need and deserve”).
40. See Jason Brennan & Christopher Freiman, Why Paternalists Must Endorse
Epistocracy, 21 J. ETHICS & SOC. PHIL. 329, 337–38 (2022); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos,
Accountability Claims in Constitutional Law, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 989, 995–96 (2018).
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Likewise, schooling should be provided to all students in equal measure
regardless of their academic prowess, because education is a right
independent of the characteristics of the students involved.
This understanding of education is deeply ingrained in American
education. The common-schoolers of the nineteenth century and the
Progressive educators of the twentieth devoted themselves to the idea, if not
the practice, that the experience of school should be “common,” essentially
the same for everyone.41 The civil rights fighters of the twentieth and
twenty-first centuries focused on schools in substantial part because
discrimination against children, whether because of race or other
characteristics, rubbed particularly hard against views of equality deep in the
American creed.42 Contemporary advocacy that objects to school choice
also rests in substantial part on this view of educational equality.43
But for others, it is obvious that where schools are concerned, academic
“merit” does deserve reward. They may see it as innately worthy of
recognition, or emphasize that rewarding it generates social value.44 “Smart”
people have the best shot, if well-trained, at curing cancer, or building
bridges, or running social-welfare programs, or winning Senate elections.45
As journalist Nathan Heller wrote in his reporting on the experiment with
selective admissions at Lowell High, for many “an important role of
education is to identify people with talent and motivation and cultivate their
potential. It’s good for society — you won’t have to worry about the universe
in which Mozart never got piano lessons.”46
Social good is also the strongest justification for exam schools under the
contest frame. But pure competition might not create strong enough
incentives, especially for a contest that requires drudgery at the books and is
preparatory for many other academic contests to come that require more

41. See CARL F. KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND AMERICAN
SOCIETY 1780–1860, 95–100 (1983); Aaron Saiger, Deconstitutionalizing Dewey, 13 FIU L.
REV. 765, 784–85 (2019).
42. See JUSTIN DRIVER, THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE: PUBLIC EDUCATION, THE SUPREME
COURT, AND THE BATTLE FOR THE AMERICAN MIND 249 (2018).
43. See, e.g., James, supra note 24, at 248 (“[S]chool choice policies problematically
encourage the sort of competition that renders some schools as ‘better’ than others.”).
44. DANIEL MARKOVITS, THE MERITOCRACY TRAP: HOW AMERICA’S FOUNDATIONAL
MYTH FEEDS INEQUALITY, DISMANTLES THE MIDDLE CLASS, AND DEVOURS THE ELITE 14
(2019)
45. This is an untestable intuition without a working definition of “smart” and a way to
measure it, neither of which is to be had. The economic literature shows strong labor-market
returns both to “skill” and educational achievement, both of which are presumably neither
perfectly correlated nor uncorrelated with the undefinable “smartness.” See, e.g., Beth F.
Ingram & George R. Neumann, The Returns to Skill, 13 LAB. ECON. 35, 35–36, 38, 55 (2006).
46. Heller, supra note 3.
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single-minded drudgery. To get everyone in the game who should be in the
game, you need a prize intrinsically worth fighting for.
This kind of thinking is also baked into American education. Rewards
pervade schooling. Exam schools are a marginal phenomenon as against the
institutions of grading and tracking (to which, of course, egalitarians also
object).47 Proponents of rewarding merit cannot stop there, of course; in
order to reward merit, one has to determine what constitutes it, how to
measure it, and what rewards work best. But these questions are all asked
within the frame that rewarding merit is a legitimate undertaking.
One critical way in which the frame of the contest and the frame of the
reward differ is in its understanding of the roles played by diligence,
resources, luck, and talent. Competitive success, whether one is trying to
raise a winning heifer or ace the admissions exam, depends on all of these.
You can’t win the best-in-show ribbon if you don’t work at it. As I have
said, that’s the reason to have the contest in the first place.48 But you also
can’t win if you have no access to a farm or know no farmers willing to teach
you how to run it. Even given a farm and a farmer, the particular farm and
farmer you have might not be as good (either as farmers or as teachers) than
those accessible to someone else. Even if the quality and quantity of access
is the same, dumb luck makes a difference: your cow might win or lose some
genetic lottery, or break its leg before the big show. And even if everyone
has equal access and equal luck, some people are just better at baking, or
hog-raising, or spelling, or test-taking, or mathematics, than others.49
Luck is random; resources, talent, and diligence are not. Both resources
and luck are orthogonal to the central purpose of competition. They play a
big role by necessity, because there can be no competition without them. (In
some competitions, luck has positive value, because some randomness
makes competition more exciting and attractive. Admissions examinations
are not in this category.) Talent and diligence are central to the goal of
competition; but the former is (mostly) not up to the competitor, and the latter
(to some important but incomplete extent) is.50
The area where the interplay between luck, circumstance, diligence, and
talent is most vivid is the exam school context is in the discussion of the role

47. See Lorin W. Anderson, A Critique of Grading: Policies, Practices, and Technical
Matters, 26 EDUC. POL’Y ANAL. ARCHIVES 1, 3 (2018) (“Despite a century of fairly constant
criticism, . . . the practice of grading students remains a cornerstone of our educational
system.”).
48. See ROGER CAILLOIS, MAN, PLAY AND GAMES 15 (Meyer Barash trans., 2001).
49. See MAGUIRE, supra note 31, at 63 (quoting Mark Twain to say, “Some people have
an idea that correct spelling can be taught, and taught to anybody. That is a mistake. The
spelling faculty is born in man, like poetry, music, and art. It is a gift; it is a talent”).
50. See CAILLOIS, supra note 48, at 19; Simmel, supra note 32, at 965.
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of test preparation. Purchasers of test-preparation services, which can be
fairly expensive, include the financially comfortable, but also include
striving families for whom the fees are a stretch. It does not include, of
course, families who don’t think prep services are a good investment; neither
does it include families who can’t afford it 51 or who don’t know about it.52
Demurring to the claim that preparation services raise scores — there is little
research on this point,53 although there are numerous marketing claims54 —
one might ask in what sense it is a problem that they can do so. Is the
problem that preparation works at all, because it prioritizes diligence over
talent?55 Is it a problem because not everyone can afford it, or is in equal
position to take advantage of it, which privileges circumstance, and
particularly financial means?56 Is the utility of preparation in fact a virtue,
because it rewards diligence, and mitigates the importance of other kinds of

51. There are free preparation services available, both online and through government
programs. Some of the latter have been established in response to the critique that test
preparation unfairly advantages those with resources. These programs obviously do not
mitigate unfairness entirely. They are not universally available and require a certain amount
of capital to access. Even if they are free, a student needs knowledge, hardware, time, and
support—in addition to talent, drive, and diligence—in order to make best use of them.
52. See Bamberger, supra note 10.
53. I have not located empirical research on the impact of test preparation on test
outcomes at the high school level. For highly mixed evidence on coaching in the contexts of
other high-stake admissions examinations, see, e.g., Betsy Jane Becker, Coaching for the
Scholastic Aptitude Test: Further Synthesis and Appraisal, 60 REV. EDUC. RES. 373, 380
(1990) (metaanalysis as of 1990 noting that variable results and design problems make it
impossible to conclude that coaching has positive effects); Derek C. Briggs, The Effect of
Admissions Test Preparation: Evidence from NELS:88, 14 CHANCE 10, 10 (2001) (“There is
an emerging consensus that particular forms of test preparation have the effect of improving
scores on sections of the SAT I for students who take the tests more than once”); William C.
McGaghie, Steven M. Downing & Ramune Kubilius, What is the Impact of Commercial Test
Preparation Courses on Medical Examination Performance?, 16 TEACHING & LEARNING
MED. 202, 202–03 (2004) (metaanalysis in the medical-school context concluding that
“current research lacks control and rigor; the incremental validity of the commercial courses
on medical examination performance, if any, is extremely small; and evidence in support of
the courses is weak or nonexistent”); Qin Xie, Does Test Preparation Work? Implications for
Score Validity, 10 LANGUAGE ASSESSMENT Q. 196 (2013) (assessing the effects of coaching
for tests of English competency for foreign-language speakers).
54. See, e.g., Donald E. Powers & Donald A. Rock, Effects of Coaching on SAT I:
Reasoning Test Scores, 36 J. EDUC. MGMT. 93, 112 (1999) (coaching effects are positive and
real but small compared to marketing claims); Valerie Strauss, Can Coaching Truly Boost
SAT Scores? For Years, the College Board Said No; Now It Says Yes, WASH. POST (May 9,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2017/05/09/can-coachingtruly-boost-sat-scores-for-years-the-college-board-said-no-now-it-says-yes/
[https://perma.cc/UBN6-KS32].
55. See, e.g., Harpalani, supra note 8, at 784 (reporting comments by the Virginia
Secretary of Education, during the debate over admissions at Fairfax’s Thomas Jefferson
School, comparing “test prep to illegal performance enhancement drugs”) (internal quotation
marks and citation removed).
56. See Grinnell, supra note 32, at 25 (raising this question with respect to science fairs).
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circumstances, including good preparation in earlier schooling, access to
non-curricular experiences that help with the test, and innate ability?
Whether we think in terms of contest or in terms of reward strongly affect
the valence of the answers to these questions. If an entrance exam is just a
pie-baking (or pie-eating) contest, we are happy to reward both diligence and
talent, and not too concerned about the complicating presence of resources
and luck. It’s a shame if a contestant’s oven breaks down on the morning of
the big day, but that possibility does not undermine the legitimacy of the
contest; likewise the exam.57 If a person who otherwise would have been
the baker of the century grows up with two diabetic parents and no sugar in
the house, that’s again a shame, but again does not delegitimize the contest.
We want to know if America’s got talent — finding a diamond in the rough
is why people tune in. As between talent and diligence, people’s tastes vary:
Some thrill to see the innately talented win effortlessly; others are impressed
by hard work. Generally, we design contests to focus upon results and leave
the diligence-versus-talent tradeoff to the spectators as they choose which
contestants to root for.58
If exam-based admission is about desert, these issues play out very
differently. A contest designed to reward merit should, most people will
think, seek to mitigate as much as feasible the roles of circumstance and of
luck. It should, many (but not all59) people will think, place a premium on
hard work, because that is the ingredient necessary for victory most in the
control of the contestant. Talent, on this view, is a special case of luck. For
others, talent is what matters, and therefore its etiology does not. In wanting
to reward the person who cures cancer, or finds the means for cheap carbon
sequestration, or can run fifty meters in the shortest time, we don’t feel the
need to pretend that only diligence deserves reward.
The contest and reward frame also matter to how we understand the prize.
One reason not to get too worked up about whose pie is best is that the blue
ribbon is not worth much. If the prize for the best pie is a million dollars, on
the other hand, citizens might appropriately want more transparent criteria
and to participate in discussion and analysis of why those criteria, and not
others, measure the thing to be rewarded.

57. See CAILLOIS, supra note 48, at 46 (“A good player must be able to contemplate with
objectivity, detachment, and at least an appearance of calm, the unlucky results of even the
most sustained effort or the loss of large sums”).
58. Maxwell J. Mehlman et al., Doping in Sports and the Use of State Power, 50 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 15, 39–43 (2005).
59. See, e.g., Harpalani, supra note 8, at 765 (presenting examples of white parents
complaining that Asian students’ participation in after-school tutoring programs harms white
children’s college prospects).
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Is admission to an exam school more like a blue ribbon or more like a
million dollars? The intensity of competition around the examinations
suggests the latter. Why else would so many families, including those of
modest means, invest significant time and treasure in preparing for them?
Likewise, the ferocity of the opposition to exam schools, and the sustained
policy, political, and academic engagement with them,60 suggests that they
matter.
That people think the stakes are high, however, is not enough. Demand
in the market is a measure that aggregates personal preferences. Those
personal preferences could be based upon mistaken, foolish, or even
nefarious ideas. To take the most obvious example, the state should not
establish segregated schools because many people prefer them. Nor should
the state run programs that people perceive to be beneficial only because they
have been misled.
It is, therefore, vital to consider whether the exam schools genuinely
confer value on the students they admit. More precisely, one must look at
whether they confer excess educational value, above the value of the
education they would get in the schools they would otherwise attend.
There are three ways that the exam schools could deliver excess value to
students. First, the exam schools might have more public resources than
other schools in the system, resources that could translate into educational
advantage. Second, they might provide students with a peer group that
enhances educational achievement. Third, exam school enrollment might
confer benefits upon students by allowing them to demonstrate that they
were chosen to enroll, independent of any actual benefits that they enjoy
when they do enroll. This would make exam schools a (very particular) kind
of status good.
i. Public Resources
The resource question is difficult to document. Exam schools as a group
offer opportunities for advanced academic study not generally offered by
other schools. This need not be a matter of resources; it could be a function
entirely of the achievement and academic preferences of enrolled students.
But it is clear that exam schools teach multiple languages, higher
mathematics, and sophisticated science at levels very different from the
modal public school.61 The relative value of these kinds of offerings may
become more pronounced if more non-exam schools adopt some current
proposals by educators concerned with equity to de-emphasize academic

60. See, e.g., MARKOVITS, supra note 44, at 11–12.
61. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 3.
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subjects in the regular curriculum.62 However, there is little reason to think
that absent the exam schools these kinds of offerings could not be available
in many other kinds of schools, at least to some extent. Districts could offer
these types of experiences across their systems in a number of ways,
including exchange programs, partnerships with colleges and universities,
and the deployment of remote-learning technologies.
Considering resources more broadly, most exam schools receive per
capita funding from the district and the state at the same baseline level as the
other schools in the public system. States and districts do not simply hand
over extra funds to such schools. However, a variety of mechanisms, none
of them exclusive to one another, may work to increase the resources
available to exam schools above the public school baseline. It has been
suggested, for example, that some districts’ policy of giving schools a
premium payment for each Advanced Placement course that they teach
provides exam schools with extra resources, because the payment exceeds
the actual marginal cost of teaching those additional courses.63 This
argument suggests another: Although I have seen no data, it might be that
required per capita expenditures on special education are lower in exam
schools than in the modal public school, since some (but not all) disabilities
make it difficult to achieve on the exams, even with accommodations.64 To
the extent that special education payments are lower than the actual costs of

62. See Position Statement: Media Education in English Language Arts, NAT’L COUNCIL
TCHRS.
ENG.
(Apr.
12,
2022),
https://ncte.org/statement/media_education
[https://perma.cc/645P-K2J3] (advocating for an emphasis on “media texts” in Englishlanguage classrooms, and on genres of communication other than essay-writing, although
insisting that “media education need not displace the study of literature”); Howard Blume,
Will Your Gifted Child Take Calculus? Maybe Not under California’s Reimagined Math Plan,
L.A. TIMES (May 20, 2022), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2021-05-20/californiacontroversial-math-overhaul-focuses-on-equity
[https://perma.cc/EE7S-HYKH]
(documenting California proposals to use heterogeneous grouping in mathematics classes
through the tenth grade in order to promote equity, which opponents regard as a “manifesto
against calculus” but which professors of education insist need not limit mathematics
achievement).
63. See Mike Elsen-Rooney, Mysterious Bonus Makes Rich NYC Schools Richer, Critics
Say, WNYC NEWS (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.wnyc.org/story/mysterious-bonus-makesrich-nyc-schools-richer-critics-say/ [https://perma.cc/PR2U-UBKE]; Heller, supra note 3
(noting a policy, recently repealed, under which “Public schools [in San Francisco were]
awarded six hundred dollars for each A.P. test taken” and observing that “Lowell offers thirtyone A.P. courses. The cash is supposed to pay for extra prep time for A.P. teachers, but what’s
left over supports other staffing: Peer Resources, tutoring, arts faculty, and a rich catalogue
of language instruction. This produces an upward spiral.”); Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Joshua
Angrist & Parag Pathak, The Elite Illusion: Achievement Effects at Boston and New York
Exam Schools 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 17264, 2011) (“Stuyvesant
offers thirty-seven AP courses, while Boston Latin School offers 23.”).
64. See Abdulkadiroğlu et al., supra note 25, at 179 (“[T]here are few special education
students in an exam school . . . .”).
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special education services, this is also a financial advantage for exam
schools. There might also be other kinds of expenses, on social services or
security for example,65 that exam schools can avoid in ways other schools
cannot because their populations are skewed towards self-selected strivers
who are there by their families’ choice.66
Another potential factor is that seniority provisions of teachers’ contracts,
which often weight the preferences of more senior teachers regarding where
they teach, provide a resource advantage to exam schools only partially
reflected in budget documents.67 If better and more experienced teachers
prefer to teach in exam schools, this will benefit those schools’ students in
ways that appear on no balance sheet. Yet another possibility is that exam
schools have PTAs and alumni associations disproportionately willing and
able to provide extra funds.68 And there are still other possibilities.
These possibilities all seem plausible. The debate over exam schools
would benefit greatly from a systematic effort to identify and quantify these
kinds of resource inequities.
There are also normative issues. Many argue that good public policy
forbids giving exam-school students some kinds of resources in amounts
above what other students receive, because they “need” it least.69 To my

65. Cf. Karen J. DeAngelis, Brian O. Brent & Danielle Ianni, The Hidden Cost of School
Security, 36 J. EDUC. FIN. 312, 329 (2011) (“Controlling for locale type and size, district
wealth has a significant negative association with security spending, although the impact is
fairly small.”).
66. See Derek W. Black, Middle-Income Peers as Educational Resources and the
Constitutional Right to Equal Access, 53 B.C. L. REV. 373, 412–13 (2012).
67. Cf. Clifford B. Donn et al., Teacher Working Conditions With and Without Collective
Bargaining, 14 NEV. L.J. 496, 502 (2014) (“Senior teachers use their seniority to transfer into
schools and classes that have the best students and are the easiest to teach. This leaves the
neediest students and schools with the most junior teachers who may or may not be those best
suited to teach them.”). More senior teachers also earn more, raising teaching costs.
68. See Abdulkadiroğlu et al., supra note 63.
69. It is not always clear what “need it the least” might mean. One might say that highperforming students do not “need” public investment because high levels of performance are
correlated with wealth, whiteness, and other forms of privilege; because the utility of the
marginal educational dollar spent on this group is lower, in terms of the quantum of learning
purchased, than it is for others; or because there is an attenuated public interest in raising
achievement levels for those who already perform above par. Each of these versions of “need”
commends different policies. A focus on background suggests intensive targeting of education
dollars to serve marginalized groups. A focus on the utility of the marginal dollar across
different types of students threatens many kinds of special-education funding along with
funding for services for high achievers. And the idea that the public is interested more in
educating everyone up to some floor of adequacy and less interested in educating above that
floor would imply, for example, that all high-school advanced courses should be phased out.
Many reasonable people would oppose all of these policies, for a range of good reasons. See,
e.g., supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.
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mind, this is unpersuasive. Schools need not take as their unidimensional
mission bringing as many students as possible to a floor of achievement.
Both law and good policy permit the distribution of government benefits for
reasons other than need, and states spend for such reasons all the time. The
public school system itself is Exhibit A, which spends enormous amounts to
educate all children, including those who might not “need” it at all.70 As
noted below,71 a state committed to educating every child as well as possible
might spend disproportionately on both high-achieving and special
education students.72
These arguments aside, the propriety of supplementation of any given
magnitude for exam schools is debatable. Unlike special education students,
exam-school students might be thought already to enjoy advantages in the
markets for employment and higher education that it is scarcely necessary to
magnify.
In the end, it may not matter very much. There is a strong (though not
universal) consensus in the educational literature that exam-school
attendance cannot be shown to improve the educational achievement of highperforming students.73 This finding is not entirely counterintuitive: the

Arguments based upon “need” also have denominator problems. Is “need” the criterion
for distributing funds only within the public education system, or should it also determine the
allocation of funds across education, housing, sanitation, recreation, and so on?
A full explication of the idea of educational “need” is far beyond the scope of this Article.
70. Depending on the definition of “need,” see supra note 69, students who don’t “need”
public education might be those with family resources to acquire education privately, or, quite
differently, those least likely to benefit from the kinds of educational services the schools
provide.
71. See infra Section II.C.
72. See Claire S. Raj, Rights to Nowhere: The IDEA’s Inadequacy in High-Poverty
Schools, 53 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 409, 460 (2022) (noting that per capita specialeducation expenditures are well above those for general-education students).
73. See, e.g., Abdulkadiroğlu et al., supra note 25, at 161, 178 (reporting “only scattered”
evidence that attendance at test schools improves scores on later standardized tests, even for
“ultra-high (baseline) achievers”); Elaine M. Allensworth et al., The Educational Benefits of
Attending Higher Performing Schools: Evidence from Chicago High Schools, 39 EDUC. EVAL.
& POL’Y ANAL. 175, 187 (2017) (all of the academic benefits associated with selective school
attendance are the result of preadmission differences among students); Will Dobbie & Roland
G. Fryer, Exam High Schools and Academic Achievement: Evidence from New York City 2
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper 17286, 2011) (insubstantial or negative effects
of exam-school attendance on testing outcomes of marginal exam-school students); Robert E.
Slavin, Achievement Effects of Ability Grouping in Secondary Schools: A Best-Evidence
Synthesis, 60 REV. EDUC. RSCH. 471, 486 (1990) (concluding that “[t]aken together, research
comparing ability-grouped to heterogeneous placements provides little support for the
proposition that high achievers gain from grouping whereas low achievers lose”); Saiying
Steenbergen-Hu, Matthew C. Makel & Paula Olszewski-Kubilius, What One Hundred Years
of Research Says About the Effects of Ability Grouping and Acceleration on K–12 Students’
Academic Achievement, 86 REV. EDUC. RSCH. 849, 875 (2016) (demonstrating that for low-,

1022

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLIX

suggestion is that high achieving students will achieve regardless of their
circumstances. But it does suggest that any unfairness in the allocation of
resources to exam schools does not ultimately bring exam-school students
actual educational advantage. One might still object that resource
differences are unfair in themselves, and wasteful besides. And one can
surely challenge the quality, relevance, and scope of the research itself.74 But
the absence of detectable effects of exam schools on student performance,
holding student characteristics constant, blunts the force of claims that examschool students unjustifiably benefit from unfairly allocated public funds or
state assets.
ii. Peer Effects
Exam schools offer students a source of potential value beyond resources:
An admitted student finds herself among schoolmates who have also
excelled on the test. Setting aside the opportunities for advanced coursework
that sorting might bring, having classmates who succeed on the test might
benefit students. However, as noted above, researchers have been unable to
demonstrate any such peer effects.75 Some of the same research, moreover,
suggests that homogeneous or tracked environments do harm lowerachieving students even as they fail to help higher achievers.76 If one accepts
this view of homogeneous grouping, abolishing exam schools would be,
roughly speaking, a Pareto improvement, hurting no one and helping many.
This conclusion is an instance of a fairly robust social-science research
finding that is inconsistent with very strong and widespread intuitions about
how schools work.77 Many exam-school parents and some teachers clearly
think that attending exam schools helps children by educating them among
high-achieving peers.78 People who have been successful students — among
whom one disproportionately finds both lawyers and academics, whose
professions are organized in many respects around both criteria of “merit”

moderate-, and high-achieving learners, between class grouping yielded insignificant effects
on academic achievement).
74. See infra notes 84–86 and accompanying text.
75. See Dennis Epple & Richard E. Romano, Peer Effects in Education: A Survey of the
Theory and Evidence, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL ECONOMY 1053, 1054 (Jess Benhabib,
Alberto Bisin & Matthew O. Jackson eds., 2011) (“For given educational resources provided
to student A, if having student B as a classmate or schoolmate affects the educational outcome
of A, then we regard this as a peer effect.”); supra note 69.
76. See Black, supra note 66, at 409–11.
77. See Epple & Romano, supra note 75, at 1054 (“The notion that peer effects are
important to educational outcomes has great intuitive appeal.”).
78. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 3 (reporting that Joe Ryan Dominguez, “hired as Lowell’s
principal” after elite admissions were abolished, “acknowledged weaker performance in the
lottery class”).

2022]

MORE THAN MERIT

1023

and extensive testing79 — can find it particularly difficult to believe that
sorting does not benefit academically successful children.80
The conflict between these popular intuitions and the research literature
might be resolved in several ways. One is to insist upon the research
findings. We do research in order to analyze and sometimes debunk
intuitions plausible on their face but incorrect in fact.81 The failure of
research to detect peer effects, therefore, is often emphasized by opponents
of exam schools, who argue their costs to other students and schools, and to
racial equity, have no countervailing benefits.82 Counterintuitively,
however, the same research can also blunt the critique of the exam schools.
If the prize for acing the test is in fact of low value, the exam-school process
is more like a contest than a reward for merit, and needs correspondingly less
rigorous justification.83
A second approach to the counterintuitive findings of the research is to
note its very substantial limitations — limitations shared by much academic
research into student achievement more generally.84 The studies rely upon
outcome measures, usually standardized tests, grades, and graduation rates,
that arguably fail to capture important kinds of learning. Achievement tests
are often limited to reading and mathematics. None of the outcome measures
gauge success above some arbitrarily defined level, making them less useful
with respect to student performance at the top tail of the distribution. Nor
do the outcome measures incorporate many nonacademic features of
learning that parents and governments reasonably care about — including,
notably, the social learning that many advocates of heterogeneous grouping
argue is the result of diversity. The studies also find it very difficult to
control for teacher effects,85 which educational economists define as

79. See Pamela Edwards, The Shell Game: Who is Responsible for the Overuse of the
LSAT in Law School Admissions?, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 153, 157 (2006) (“Most law schools
rely heavily on LSAT scores when evaluating candidates for admission.”); Susan Katcher,
Legal Training in the United States: A Brief History, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 335, 346 (2006)
(noting the requirement in all but two states of passage to the bar examination to practice law).
80. See Maimon Schwarzschild, Academic Admissions at Elite Universities and at
Specialized Public High Schools: Déjà Vu All Over Again?, 49 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1187,
1198 (2022) (“[I]t is surely difficult to maintain plausibly that reducing academic standards
for admission would not have any negative effect in the classroom, or on the academic
demands that students could be held to in these schools.”).
81. See Eloise Pasachoff, Two Cheers for Evidence: Law, Research, and Values in
Education Policymaking and Beyond, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1933, 1968–69 (2017).
82. See Abdulkadiroğlu et al., supra note 25, at 179 (“[P]arents either mistakenly equate
attractive peers with high value added, or . . . they value exam schools for reasons other than
their impact on learning.”); Buery, supra note 20, at 115–16.
83. See supra Section II.A.
84. See Pasachoff, supra note 81, at 1952–61.
85. See Dobbie & Fryer, supra note 73, at 2 n.3.
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“differences in effectiveness between teachers within schools.”86 And
teacher effects are plausibly at the root of the gap between research and
intuition in this area. It is possible that heterogeneous grouping can succeed
in the classroom of a master teacher, but that students taught by teachers of
more ordinary skill will learn better if grouped homogeneously.
The strength of one’s intuitions will affect how one understands the
shortcomings of the studies. All social science, and educational research in
particular, has methodological limits like these.87 Education research does
not so much establish facts as try to understand the likelihood that some set
of effects is at work and the ways in which they might offset one another.88
That research design is limited or imperfect is no reason to ignore findings.
But the limitations of the science can also be sufficiently substantial that one
should conclude that it should not drive the resolution of a particular
educational policy question. As Eloise Pasachoff has persuasively
demonstrated, decisions about education law and policy are often and
justifiably made notwithstanding a contrary research consensus —
justifiably both because educational research is inherently limited89 and
because, at bottom, the decisions to be made rest on value judgements rather
than empirical questions.90
The intuition that sorting benefits academic performance is quite robust.
It is reflected in numerous aspects of secondary education, organizes much
of the higher education sector, and helps organize the learned professions.
At the same time, the research in this area is substantially limited. In my
view, these factors together make it reasonable to treat the creation of peer
effects as a genuine benefit that accrues to exam-school students. At a
minimum, it is difficult — not impossible, not logically incoherent, but
difficult — simultaneously to argue (a) that exam schools should be
abolished because the research documents no benefits to their students and
(b) that the exam schools unjustifiably reward the privilege by giving them
extra public and peer resources — when the research cannot document that
those resources translate into advantage.
At the same time, there is a duty on the part of those who seek to privilege
these kinds of intuitions to recognize that an intuition or conviction that

86. Hans Luyten, The Size of School Effects Compared to Teacher Effects: An Overview
of the Research Literature, 14 SCH. EFFECTIVENESS & SCH. IMPROVEMENT, 31, 31 (2003).
87. See Pasachoff, supra note 81, at 1958–59; Benjamin Michael Superfine, New
Directions in School Funding and Governance: Moving from Politics to Evidence, 98 KY.
L.J. 653, 670 (2010) (noting that courts making school finance decisions often fail to “loo[k]
deeply at scientific evidence” and ignore or discount disagreements among researchers).
88. See Pasachoff, supra note 81, at 1937.
89. See id. at 1967–68.
90. See id. at 1968–71.
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homogeneous grouping helps the talented, research notwithstanding, may in
fact disguise racial preferences, whether conscious, unconscious, or some
combination.91 Parents and others who insist that test-excelling students
learn more when surrounded by similarly accomplished peers may in fact be
using the test to recast less palatable preferences for students to learn among
others like them. Society, of course, should not honor such preferences. I
am aware of no empirical work that even attempts to determine the role that
racist preferences and racist systems play in shaping public views of tracking
and grouping. The methodological challenges would be substantial.
In addition, or in the alternative, these intuitions might reflect preferences
that cannot fairly be said to be about race but that have been powerfully
shaped by cultural and institutional factors that developed as they did
because of race. Parents might be thinking as they do about excellence and
peer groups in the context of a racialized culture.92 One might accept this
argument in principle without being sure of its extent; and one might demur
to it without its being clear what the policy cash-out should be. “Although
no less harmful than schooling segregation animated by intentional
discrimination,” Osamudia James notes, such beliefs and the choices to
which they lead are “beyond the reach of equality jurisprudence.”93 One
might extend James’s observation to legislative and regulatory decisions
about exam schools as well.
iii. Signaling and Status
Finally, even if individuals wrongly associate exam schools with
academic benefit, they might rationally devote even substantial resources to
securing admission if enrollment is rewarded by other institutions. For
example, if matriculation at an exam school came with no substantial
benefits to learning, but substantially increased the likelihood of admission
to an elite university,94 then the exam school is providing value to its student

91. See James, supra note 24, at 210.
92. See Chase M. Billingham & Matthew O. Hunt, School Racial Composition and
Parental Choice, 89 SOCIO. EDUC. 99, 101 (2016) (“parents’ bounded rationality often leads
them to make choices based on expedient, non-academic factors, including schools’ racial
composition . . . .”).
93. James, supra note 24, at 212.
94. See Ellen Barry, Boston Overhauls Admissions to Exclusive Exam Schools, N.Y.
TIMES (July 15, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/15/us/boston-schools-entranceexams-admissions.html [https://perma.cc/2YGQ-N25Y] (stating that Boston Latin School
“serve[s] as a gateway to elite colleges.”). Cf. Consolo, supra note 7, at 1251 (“The
admissions process for [New York’s] Specialized High Schools is so competitive because
attending these institutions is ‘considered one of the only ways to access an elite education
that virtually guarantees a pathway to college.’”).
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— even if the elite institution is wrong to think that exam-school students
are better prepared for college work.
It is also the case that a university might rationally favor exam-school
students for admission even if they did not think they were better prepared,
because success on the initial exam is plausibly correlated with, as we have
seen, both talent and diligence (even as it also depends upon luck and
circumstance). This idea, that elite institutions serve their students not by
training them better than other places but merely by sorting and then
credentialing them has been most thoroughly developed in the context of
elite universities themselves.95 Elite universities arguably benefit their
students primarily by giving them a credential attesting to their brilliance, a
credential with which they can enter the working world. 96 As the Wizard
tells the Scarecrow, people who come out of universities “think deep
thoughts, and with no more brains than you have; but they have one thing
you haven’t got — a diploma.”97 The exam school embodies the same idea,
one level down. And even though people change, sorting at younger ages
can rationally inform sorting at older ages. Only if talent and diligence at
time one were entirely uncorrelated with talent and diligence at time two
would exam-school admission be irrelevant to a university that itself is in the
business of sorting.
If exam schools are about credentialing, exam-school admission is a way
that students can buy themselves — or that parents can buy for their children
— status that is a ticket to future value. Admission might even be a “status
good” in the economists’ sense, i.e., a Veblen good whose price goes up as
demand increases — because the exclusivity of the diploma is greater the
fewer people have it.98 Even if not a Veblen good per se, exam-school
admission could be a valuable investment in status in the sociologists’ sense
of the term as a marker of relational superiority.99 Education clearly

95. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, THE TYRANNY OF MERIT: WHY THE PROMISE OF
MOVING UP IS PULLING AMERICA APART 155 (2020) (“[H]igher education has become a
sorting machine that promises mobility on the basis of merit but entrenches privilege and
promotes attitudes towards success corrosive of the commonality democracy requires.”).
96. See, e.g., Roy Y. Chan, Understanding the Purpose of Higher Education: An Analysis
of the Economic and Social Benefits for Completing a College Degree, 6 J. EDUC. POL’Y,
PLANNING, & ADMIN. 1, 19 (2016) (“More educated workers may receive higher pay wages
because higher education provides them with a credential, rather than acquired skills.”).
97. THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939).
98. See, e.g., B. Curtis Eaton & Mukesh Eswaran, Well‐Being and Affluence in the
Presence of a Veblen Good, 119 ECON. J. 1088, 1089 (2009). For a suggestion that elite
university degrees can be Veblen goods, see Paul F. Campos, The Extraordinary Rise and
Sudden Decline of Law School Tuition: A Case Study of Veblen Effects in Higher Education,
48 SETON HALL L. REV. 167, 177 (2017).
99. See Elizabeth Currid-Halkett, Hyojung Lee & Gary D. Painter, Veblen Goods and
Urban Distinction: The Economic Geography of Conspicuous Consumption, 59 J. REG’L SCI.
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functions in this way in many contexts, including but not limited to racial
status.100 And although status investment is eminently reasonable for
individuals, status seems like a bad thing for the state to invest in providing
for its citizens. To do so is to reify unfair relationships and pay for increased
inequity, essentially for its own sake.101
Given all the unknowns, it seems fair to say that exam schools might well
provide educational benefits to their students above and beyond those of
other schools — but they might not. To the extent that those benefits are
about resources or status, it is hard to justify making them prizes in a statesponsored competition. But to the extent that the benefits flow from sorting,
the reward is tied to the fact of the exam. And to the extent that the benefits
of sorting are substantial, this is a justification for the exam school itself.
Therefore, the nature and magnitude of these benefits should determine how
much rigor is required in determining what should be tested for, whether the
test measures what it purports to measure, and how to minimize the impact
of luck and circumstance.
C. Exam Schools as Sites of Differentiated Instruction
The discussion of the benefits of the exam school has, to this point,
focused on their role as a contest, with the reward of enrollment being a prize
whose value is subject to dispute. The disputed benefits of sorting, however,
suggest a third frame through which to view the exam schools: not as a
contest or as a reward, but simply as a publicly provided service. A fairly
blunt way of inhabiting this frame is to argue that the polity as whole benefits
from educating especially talented and diligent students to the boundaries of
their potential. Even if unfair, it helps everyone to identify these students
and prioritize their education.102 A more sophisticated framing is to say that
the state has a duty, constitutional and civic, to educate all children.103 The
exam school might be the best way — or just a good way — to educate some
of those children.104 This would justify establishing such schools — not as

83, 85 (2019) (“[A]n emerging line of research . . . studies ‘inconspicuous consumption,’
which is defined as subtle, luxury goods and services that are not overtly materialistic but that
also act as social signifiers . . . . [E]ducation . . . and efforts toward attaining cultural capital
are cited as examples . . . .”).
100. See James, supra note 24, at 227, 232.
101. See id. at 242 (arguing that public investment in status is inconsistent with the antisubordination goals of civil rights law).
102. See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.
103. See Weishart, supra note 17, at 936 (“The right to education has taken the form of a
claim-right held by children . . . . ‘[M]ost state constitutions [furnish] a strong textual basis
for an explicit . . . duty to provide for education.’”) (internal citations omitted).
104. See Buery, supra note 20, at 118.
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a contest or as a reward, but as an effort to do well by a group of children
with particular needs.
Framing exam schools as a method of serving a population with particular
needs has its own resonance in American educational theory, which has
grafted onto the idea of schools common to all that education should meet
each student where she is.105 Equity, goes the educators’ refrain, is not
equality; each student should be given what she needs, and students need
different things.106 To be sure, this principle is most often articulated on the
contemporary scene to justify providing additional resources to students who
face various kinds of disadvantage. But a truly robust concept of equity
might lead one to insist that all students should get what they need, even
those already blessed by circumstance, luck, diligence, or talent.107 (And, of
course, many students are disadvantaged in some ways and advantaged in
others.108)
Educators call an approach in which teachers adapt their teaching to the
needs of each pupil “differentiated instruction.”109 The practice of
differentiated instruction partially explains and justifies the commitment of
the education-research establishment to heterogeneous grouping.110

105. See, e.g., SIGAL R. BEN-PORATH & MICHAEL C. JOHANEK, MAKING UP OUR MIND:
WHAT SCHOOL CHOICE IS REALLY ABOUT 64 (2019) (“[C]urrent school choice developments
reflect only the latest manifestation of th[e] enduring trend [since World War II] toward more
differentiated schooling options for a republic of consumers.”).
106. See, e.g., Harerimana Jean Paul, Equity vs. Equality: Facilitating Equity in the
Classroom, 6 INT’L J. RSCH. & SCI. INNOVATION 216, 216 (2019) (“Equality can be defined as
treating every individual in the same manner irrespective of needs and
requirements . . . [while] [e]quity can be defined as the quality of treating individuals fairly
based on their needs and requirements.”); N.Y.C. SCH. DIVERSITY ADVISORY GRP., MAKING
THE GRADE: THE PATH TO REAL INTEGRATION AND EQUITY FOR NYC PUBLIC SCHOOL
STUDENTS 25 (2019) (henceforth MAKING THE GRADE I) (“Equity . . . means all people receive
what they need to be successful in their education. It focuses on equal opportunities not equal
inputs, recognizing that different individuals have different access, challenges, histories and
needs.”).
107. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chu et al., Family Moves and the Future of Public Education, at
61–63
(August
10,
2022)
(unpublished
Article),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4187069
[https://perma.cc/LH7P3R2Y] (sketching a program of “developmental contextualization” through which schools can
advance both democratic and pedagogical goals by tailoring schooling to individual
differences); Dante Dixson et al., A Call to Reframe Gifted Education as Maximizing
Learning, 102 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 22, 24 (2020).
108. See Dixon, supra note 107, at 22–23; Charles J. Russo, Unequal Educational
Opportunities for Gifted Students: Robbing Peter to Pay Paul?, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 727,
731–32 (2001).
109. See, e.g., CAROL A. TOMLINSON, DIFFERENTIATED INSTRUCTION 262 (2005); Pearl
Subban, Differentiated Instruction: A Research Basis, 7 INT’L EDUC. J. 935, 940 (2006).
110. See, e.g., Stavroula Valiandes, Evaluating the Impact of Differentiated Instruction on
Literacy and Reading in Mixed Ability Classrooms: Quality and Equity Dimensions of
Education Effectiveness, 45 STUD. EDUC. EVAL. 17, 17 (2015).
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Homogeneous grouping is not necessary if every student can get what she
needs in any classroom. But if differentiation makes sense at the individual
level, it can also make sense at the level of the classroom — that’s tracking
— or the school. Differentiation thus undergirds both commitments on the
left to heterogeneity and conservative and libertarian commitments to school
choice and consumer sovereignty. The same thing is not good for everyone,
the right-leaning version of this argument goes; so, the best way to be fair to
everyone is to give them what they want, which is the closest implementable
version of giving everyone what they need.
Is it plausible to see exam schools just as a mode of differentiated
instruction? It is hard to imagine objections in a context where resources are
plentiful enough and the non-equality version of equity valued enough that
one feels confident that all students are given what they need. That, of
course, is not our system, where inequality and inequity are both pervasive.
Exam schools are Exhibit A for those who fear that differentiation will
benefit only some.111 But movement towards differentiation, even in an
imperfect and unfair system, could still be labeled as progress — as not
letting the perfect be the enemy of the good. And it is progress, relative to a
grim Harrison Bergeron world where everyone is treated exactly the same.112
If sorting by examination benefits high-scoring students whose instruction
is differentiated, then the legitimacy of the exam school depends, as it does
in the frame of the meritocratic contest, on the exam itself. Is the particular
exam used, or any exam, the best way to sort in order to realize the benefits
of differentiation for this group of students? Perhaps a different exam, or a
vector of academic measures that excludes the exam, or a vector that weights
the exam differently, or even a vector that includes both academic and nonacademic measures, would sort better than the current exam, or sort as least
as well with fewer costs to fairness and equity. These are mixed empirical
and normative questions, but we are far from being able to generate the kinds
of evidence that would address their empirical dimensions. These questions
are therefore likely to be debated on the basis of intuition, parental and
professional judgment, and politics.
D. Exam Schools as Pork
If, on the other hand, exam schools generate value not through sorting but
through the application of disproportionate resources or through the
manufacture of status through scarcity, then the exam schools start to look
like any public good or public bad whose benefits or costs cannot be evenly

111. See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text,
112. See Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., Harrison Bergeron, MAG. FANTASY & SCI. FICTION, Oct.
1961, at 5, reprinted in KURT VONNEGUT, JR., WELCOME TO THE MONKEY HOUSE 7 (1998).
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distributed to all.113 A jobs-generating military base has to be placed
somewhere, but everywhere can’t have a military base; some particular place
gets the base and its jobs and other places do not.114 A pollution-generating
power plant or waste treatment facility has to be placed somewhere, but you
don’t need them everywhere; some particular place will ultimately bear the
pollution costs and others will not.115 Likewise, if everyone cannot have
schools that are equally good, then an unusually good school will benefit
some particular students and not others. Like decisions about where to place
military bases or polluting facilities, the public-good exam school question
becomes one about siting, although not in a geographical sense. Who
benefits and who does not?
In the United States, siting decisions are generally made through
politically inflected bureaucratic procedure.116 Public goods are pork, and
pork is what politicians allocate.117 This seems a fair characterization of an
important slice of the contemporary debate over exam schools. In New York
City, some advocates who oppose exam schools have opposed the use of any
sorting of students into schools by academic criteria. But many others have
sought instead to tweak the measure of merit: Instead of or in addition to the
exam, they argue, admission should depend upon grades, or teacher
recommendations, or attendance.118 These proposals seem motivated by the
understanding that any given measure of “merit” — more accurately, any set
of criteria whatsoever — comes with particular distributional effects.119
Advocates for recommendations and grades and test-only purists all seem to
believe that, at least in New York City, adding grades and recommendations
to exam scores as admissions criteria will redistribute seats to Black and
Latino youngsters and away from Asian American students. As is true in the
debate over affirmative action by race in higher education, what you favor

113. See Robert Cameron Mitchell & Richard T. Carson, Property Rights, Protest, and the
Siting of Hazardous Waste Facilities, 76 AMER. ECON. REV. 285, 287 (1986).
114. See Lilly Goren, The Politics of Military Bases, 9 FORUM 1, 8–9 (2011); Andy
Hultquist & Tricia L. Petras, An Examination of the Local Economic Impacts of Military Base
Closures, 26 ECON. DEV. Q. 151, 152 (2012).
115. See Mitchell & Carson, supra note 113.
116. See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 464–65, 476–77 (1994).
117. See ROBERT M. STEIN & KENNETH N. BICKERS, PERPETUATING THE PORK BARREL:
POLICY SUBSYSTEMS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 4 (1997); Diana Evans, Pork Barrel
Politics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 315–316 (George C.
Edwards III, Frances E. Lee, & Eric Schickler eds., 2011).
118. See, e.g., Consolo, supra note 7, at 1260–1262.
119. See id. at 1262; RSCH. ALL. FOR N.Y.C. SCH., PATHWAYS TO AN ELITE EDUCATION:
EXPLORING STRATEGIES TO DIVERSIFY NYC’S SPECIALIZED HIGH SCHOOLS 5–6 (2015)
(modeling the distributional effects by race and ethnicity of alternative admissions regimes).
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depends on whom you seek to benefit.120 Those who see the exam school
process as a competition for seats among racial and ethnic subgroups, and
seek to engineer admissions criteria to get the distribution that they desire,
are engaged in the politics of pork.
There is nothing wrong with pork. Politics is the process by which society
determines who gets what, and not every good is evenly divisible. To be
against pork is therefore like being against gravity, or friction — good or
bad, we are stuck with it. But framing the process as one about pork makes
clear an important frame for the exam-school debate, which is that it is about
the intergroup power politics of who gets what.
*
It is not wrong to say that the debate over examination schools is a debate
about fairness; but it is a mistake to say that it is a debate only about
meritocracy. Clearly, rewarding merit is one way to see, and a way in which
many interlocutors in the exam-school debate do see, the purpose of the
exam school. This understanding brings with it certain duties of fairness and
equity on the part of the state. But there are ways in which the meritocratic
frame does not reflect the exam-school problem, including in particular that
admission to the exam school may be a prize that does not bring any real
benefit to its recipients. It is therefore imperative to recognize that exam
schools can also be seen in other ways — as contests where the prize is not
the point, as attempts to differentiate instruction, and as pork for politicians
to distribute.
This Part has shown that the selection of frame has enormous bearing on
the plausibility and persuasiveness of various arguments for and against
admission by test. In the next Part, I note one thing that the frames other
than meritocracy all have in common: They elevate the importance, in
thinking about the legitimacy of exam schools, of the structure of the school
system in which those schools are located.
III. SECOND-ORDER DIVERSITY
A. First- and Second-Order Diversity
In 2005, Heather Gerken elaborated a distinction between two sorts of
diversity that might characterize a population divided into multiple districts
or subgroups.121 She calls these “first-order” and “second-order” diversity.

120. Cf. MAGUIRE, supra note 31, at 73–74 (noting that the spelling bees were important
to immigrants in the 1900s because they “play[] no favorites . . . in any sense” and offered
“the levelest of level playing fields”); id. at 81 (same with respect to equity between “boys
and girls”).
121. See generally Gerken, supra note 21.
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Consider a jurisdiction 70% of whose population is from Group A and 30%
from Group B. If every electoral district and jury in the jurisdiction is
designed to have 70% A and 30% B, then these institutions are “first-order”
diverse; each district and jury reflects the diversity of the jurisdiction.122
Such a system, however, never gives minority group B enough power to
control outcomes. Second-order diversity seeks diversity in composition
among subgroups. Some juries and districts are created where B has a
majority. This gives B access to real power some of the time. The cost,
however, is that B is underrepresented in other juries and districts. This is
second-order diversity.123 Institutional design, Gerken argues, requires
“tradeoffs” between these two types of diversity.124
Gerken’s distinction was made with voting districts and juries, not
schools, in mind. This Part suggests that Gerken’s binary can be adapted to
nonetheless offer a productive way to think about test-only school
admissions.125 Admission by test, I argue, is often reasonable and may even
be desirable in school systems whose schools display robust second-order
diversity. When second-order diversity among schools is anemic, test
schools pose much greater concerns.
One issue in applying Gerken’s work in this new context is that the term
“diversity” itself has repeatedly changed in meaning between the time of
Bakke v. Regents, when that the Supreme Court elevated diversity to a central
concern of school integration debates,126 the time in which Gerken wrote,
and today. Many now reject diversity as a policy goal for schools.127 Critics
on the right — a group that, it seems nearly certain, will soon include the
Supreme Court128 — seek to replace diversity with a principle of formal

122. See id. at 1107 (proponents of first-order diversity “believe that, in the best of all
possible worlds, half of our legislators would be women, all of our schools would be racially
integrated, and the proportion of African American corporate executives in the United States
would correspond to the proportion of African Americans in the population”).
123. See id. at 1122.
124. See id. at 1111.
125. I have applied Gerken’s analysis to other school governance questions as well. See
Aaron J. Saiger, The School District Boundary Problem, 42 URB. LAW. 493, 524–25 (2010).
126. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978).
127. See Meera E. Deo, The End of Affirmative Action, 100 N.C. L. REV. 237, 275 (2021);
N.Y.C. SCH. DIVERSITY ADVISORY GRP., MAKING THE GRADE II: NEW PROGRAMS FOR BETTER
SCHOOLS 10 (2019) (henceforth MAKING THE GRADE II) (“Diversity means something
different in each community and recommendations should speak to that broad definition.”).
128. See Order Granting Petition for Certiorari in Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard,
142 S. Ct. 895 (2021) (mem.); Order Granting Petition for Certiorari in Students for Fair
Admissions, Inc. v. Univ. of N.C., 142 S. Ct. 896 (2022) (mem.); Erwin Chemerinsky, The
Supreme Court and Racial Progress, 100 N.C. L. REV. 833, 852 (2022) (“ [T]here are now
likely six votes on the Court — Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett —
who will say that Bakke, Grutter, and Fisher were wrongly decided.”); Deo, supra note 127,
at 239 (“The Supreme Court has signaled the end of affirmative action.”).
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fairness: “The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race.”129 On the left, critics argue that diversity
criteria inappropriately center the values of mixing and the well-being of
majorities instead of focusing on reparative justice.130 Nevertheless,
“diversity” in Gerken’s primary sense — how to manage assignment and
representation of multiple groups within institutions — remains the central
concern of school law and policy with respect to race.
Gerken’s fundamental concern is with “disaggregated democracy.”131
Her subject is governance. This is why she focuses on representative bodies
like juries and electoral districts.132 Schools are public services, the object
rather than the mechanism of governance.133 To apply Gerken’s taxonomy
to schools themselves, rather than just to their governing “committees,”134 is
therefore an extension of Gerken’s theory. But it is not an inappropriate one.
First, schools are unique among public services in their relationship to the
project of democratic governance. There is substantial consensus that a
central goal of public education is to promote the democratic project. Many
also argue that public schools should adopt aspects of democratic governance
internally, in order to model democratic practice for their students and give
them experience in such practice.135 Schools are not themselves institutions
of governance, but it is important that they instantiate the same political
values that underlie governing institutions.

129. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007)
(plurality opinion).
130. See, e.g., Adam Chilton et al., Assessing Affirmative Action’s Diversity Rationale, 122
COLUM. L. REV. 331, 350–52 (2022) (“[T]he diversity rationale may well be perceived as
treating the minority . . . as an ornament, a curiosity, one who brings an element of the piquant
to the lives of white professors and students”; “If diversity of views or experience were the
objective, one would expect to see a preference for foreign students or members of minority
religions, which is not the case.”); Deo, supra note 127, at 240 (“Instead of relying solely on
diversity, we need an equity-focused affirmative action model that targets the full inclusion
of our most vulnerable students.”); Osamudia R. James, White Like Me: The Negative Impact
of the Diversity Rationale on White Identity Formation, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 425, 426 (2014)
(“[T]he diversity rationale does not promote progressive thinking about race and identity.
Rather it perpetuates an old story . . . about the expendability of [black and brown] bodies
once they are no longer needed.”).
131. See Gerken, supra note 21, at 1108–09.
132. See id. at 1102 (describing second-order diversity as a way of thinking about
“decisionmaking bodies,” such as “juries, electoral districts, appellate panels, [and] school
committees”).
133. See id. at 1107–08 (using schools as examples to illustrate first- and second-order
diversity while noting that the example is “outside of the governance context”).
134. See id. at 1102.
135. See, e.g., Emily Buss, Developing the Free Mind, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S.
EDUCATION LAW 81, 86–87 (Kristine L. Bowman ed. 2021).
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Second, as Gerken herself notes, schools share with juries and voting
districts their “disaggregated” institutional design.136 There are multiple
schools in a jurisdiction; each student in the jurisdiction must be assigned to
one and no more than one; no one is left out.137 The process of populating
schools with students can therefore be designed with either first- or secondorder diversity in mind.138
This Article does not undertake fully to analyze or even to explicate how
best to resolve the conflicting visions offered by educational policies that
focus upon first-order and second-order diversity. Rather, it makes the more
modest point that a policy of test-only or test-based admissions in a small
number of public schools has greater potential to advance the democratic and
educational project when a school system is broadly characterized by robust
second-order diversity. Conversely, in systems where exam schools reduce
first-order diversity where second-order diversity is also absent, the critique
of the exam schools gains force.
B. The Case of New York City
The case of the public high schools of New York City, the battlefield over
which so many engagements in test-school debate has been fought, provides
an excellent context for developing this argument because proponents of
both first- and second-order diversity — both of whom see the two kinds of
diversity as incompatible — stage their dispute in full voice in contemporary
debates over how New York City schools should operate.139 Should every
city school “look like the city,” representative across the many axes of
difference that characterize the New York student population? Or should
schools be different from one another, so that the schools taken together
“look like” the city — some places integrated over all kinds of difference,
and others dominated by particular groups? The debate over the test schools
is a synecdoche for this conflict.

136. Gerken, supra note 21, at 1107–09.
137. See Saiger, supra note 125, at 536 (“Unlike general local governments, but like
electoral districts, school districts are a complete, discrete map.”).
138. Cf. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 711–
14, 716–17 (2007) (describing diversity-conscious student assignment systems).
139. This conflict is not new; indeed it is of long-standing, although its political valence
has shifted repeatedly. Ironically, the cry that organized the fierce and formative educational
politics of New York in the 1960s emanated from the same communities where advocacy for
first-order diversity is concentrated today—and that cry was for “community control,” i.e.,
second-order diversity. African American educators in the 1960s sought the right to choose
their own teachers for their own students, a right they would not have when all schools were
built to serve the political needs of the whole city. See generally RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG,
TOUGH LIBERAL: ALBERT SHANKER AND THE BATTLES OVER SCHOOLS, UNIONS, RACE, AND
DEMOCRACY (2009); DIANE RAVITCH, THE GREAT SCHOOL WARS (1974).
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New York’s current system of high-school admissions is one of citywide
choice, where students may request admission to wide range of very different
high schools across the city. Only a handful of schools among the hundreds
available — Stuyvesant, Bronx Science, and a few sister schools — admit
students solely on the basis of an admissions test.140 Scores of other city
high schools use tests as one among several academic measures that
determine admission, notably but not exclusively middle-school grades.141
(These schools share this approach with the pre-reform policy in San
Francisco’s Lowell and Fairfax’s Thomas Jefferson schools.)142 Still other
schools combine academic measures with measures intended to diversify the
student population by wealth or neighborhood.143 Neighborhood, in New
York as in many other places, is a proxy for race, because race cannot factor
directly into individualized admission decisions under current Supreme
Court caselaw.144
Still other schools seek diversity not only by wealth and neighborhood,
but by academic achievement, looking to admit classes with a large range of
academic abilities and accomplishments.145 Some schools use interviews,
auditions, and portfolios to screen for student characteristics orthogonal to
both academics and wealth, such as leadership potential or artistic ability.146

140. See MAKING THE GRADE I, supra note 106, at 74.
141. See MAKING THE GRADE II, supra note 127, at 20. This was the model that Mayor de
Blasio unsuccessfully advocated for the City’s test schools. See Consolo, supra note 7, at
1254.
142. See Chester Finn, A Progressive Assault on Selective High Schools, WALL ST. J., Nov.
27, 2020, at A15 (noting that Thomas Jefferson [formally] used a ‘holistic’ admissions process
that consider[ed] essays, interviews . . . teacher recommendations . . . grades, and tests
scores”); see also Jay Mathews, Why Not Lottery Admissions for Great High Schools?, WASH.
POST (Jan. 16, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2022/01/16/selectivehigh-school-lottery/ [https://perma.cc/SZF8-QS4B] (noting Lowell High School considered
grades and test scores in making admissions decisions before its lottery system was
introduced).
143. See MAKING THE GRADE I, supra note 106, at 47.
144. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 747–
48 (2007) (plurality opinion); id. at 789 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (permitting the use of “race
conscious” proxy categories, but not individual racial identities, in public-school student
assignment); see also Sarah Diem, Seeking Diversity: The Challenges of Implementing a
Race-Neutral Student Assignment Plan in an Urban School District, 28 INT’L J. QUAL. STUDS.
EDUC. 842, 847 (2015) (“Although SES is not considered by some to be an adequate substitute
for race, because of the current legal and political context, districts are increasingly
implementing SES-based and other race-neutral student assignment plans”).
145. See MAKING THE GRADE II, supra note 127, at 19 (describing the City’s “Ed Opt”
model as one that seeks for each high school “an appropriate mix of high, medium and low
academic achieving students”).
146. See Consolo, supra note 7, at 1249 n.17. For a description of the audition process in
2022,
see
High
School
Auditions,
N.Y.C.
DEP’T
EDUC.,
https://www.schools.nyc.gov/enrollment/enroll-grade-by-grade/high-school/high-schoolauditions. [https://perma.cc/ZDE9-ZSUC] (last visited Sept. 14, 2022).
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And still others do not “screen” at all, taking all comers on a first-come-firstserve or lottery basis. Some of these have developed special programs of
interest to particular students, so that students who share those interests apply
disproportionately.147 Others function essentially as neighborhood high
schools, although they are formally available to students citywide.148
New York City’s high school system, in other words, is organized to be
second-order diverse. There are many schools. Their programs differ from
one another. Both student choice and different admissions procedures result
in different kinds of student bodies.149 This is a model that privileges
differentiation. It also means, in practice, that some schools — the test-only
schools first among them — do not exhibit first-order diversity either by race
or by academic achievement.150
The debate over which kind of diversity should organize New York City
schools, especially with regard to race, is explicit and heated. In two reports
issued in 2019,151 an important advisory commission convened by New York
City’s Mayor, Bill de Blasio — who expended a great deal of political capital
on opposing test schools — recommended that every school should “look
like,” i.e., have a racial composition that mirrors, its borough (in the short
term), and the City as a whole (in the medium term).152 Screened schools,
including test schools, come in for special criticism.153
This
recommendation frames the City’s alternatives as a stark choice between
first-order diversity and segregated schools. And segregated schools, the
reports argue, are both intolerably unjust and pedagogically perverse.
Second-order diversity is valuable only as a stop gap154 — and perhaps, once
first-order diversity has been thoroughly achieved, as a way to add even more
value to the system.
New York’s exam schools challenge this conclusion. Several of the
benefits of second-order diversity that Gerken lists directly echo the examschools debate. One is the tradeoff between presence and control. In a first147. See generally N.Y.C. DEP’T EDUC., 2022 NYC PUBLIC SCHOOLS ADMISSION GUIDE
(2022).
148. See id.
149. See Wong, supra note 1 (New York City’s system confronts students with a
“cornucopia of beautiful and horrible choices”).
150. Cf. Gerken, supra note 21, at 1113.
151. See MAKING THE GRADE I, supra note 106; see also MAKING THE GRADE II, supra note
127.
152. See MAKING THE GRADE II, supra note 127, at 6.
153. See id. at 77 (noting the relationship between screened admissions and school
segregation in high school).
154. See, e.g., John A. Powell, Black Immersion Schools, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 669, 680 (1995) (arguing that “during a crisis in which Black children are consigned
to inferior ghetto schools, [Black] communities should have room to experiment with
immersion schools”).
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order diverse system, minorities are never entirely excluded, but neither are
they ever majorities in a position to control outcomes.155 This observation
closely tracks the complaint of many Asian American advocates of the test
schools. Because Asian American students apparently enjoy some
comparative advantage in test-taking, regardless of reason, admission by test
gives the Asian American community the relatively rare chance to be the
majority group in some school community.156 Likewise, the argument tracks
the views of those unconcerned by race who see test schools as way to serve
extraordinarily talented youth — talented on a particular dimension — by
placing them among others similarly talented. Even if one demurs to the
argument that such environments do not create better educational outcomes,
schools are not entirely about outcomes (and certainly not only about the
outcomes measured by researchers.)157
Moreover, unlike the juries or appellate panels with which Gerken is
concerned, schools are also communities characterized by cultures (both
racial and otherwise), social norms, and democratic practice. The exam
school concentrates particular approaches to these in a particular place. That
concentration does trade “influence” for “control;”158 to be in control in the
exam schools means less influence in other schools. Gerken suggests that a
minority can benefit from such a tradeoff.159 I suggest that this argument
applies to racial minorities but also to minorities defined by test-taking
prowess. Second-order diversity offers both kinds of minorities substantial
influence over school culture in some schools, at the cost of reducing their
already modest control in the remaining schools.
Moreover, Gerken suggests, the overall “democratic fairness” of a system
can benefit from second-order diversity.160 The same could be said about
“educational fairness.” A test school might promote an educational vision
different than, and even in conflict with, the modal vision, forcing
conversation161 but not undermining modal practice.162
This last suggestion is connected to Gerken’s provocative observation that
second-order diversity can bring benefits “in the aggregate.”163 Having
argued that the jury is a quintessentially second-order diverse institution, she
155. See Gerken, supra note 21, at 1126.
156. See Saiger, supra note 4 (documenting Asian American majorities in four of New
York’s eight test schools in the 2013–14 school year); Harpalani, supra note 8, at 774
(documenting the same phenomenon in admissions to Stuyvesant High in 2019).
157. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
158. See Gerken, supra note 21, at 1126.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 1125.
161. See id. at 1134.
162. Cf. id. at 1131.
163. Id. at 1139.
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writes: “If we understand ‘the law,’ as shaped by jury verdicts, to be the
aggregation of many jury verdicts, then the influence/control tradeoff takes
place not only at the level of individual jury verdicts, but also at the level of
jury verdicts in the aggregate.”164 Minorities, she suggests, might be better
served by a system that sometimes produces outlier verdicts than by one that
moves all verdicts in the same direction, because those anticipating a
theoretical jury must account for the possibility of outliers, and because
outlying views are systematically introduced into the overall system.
Translated to the exam-school context, this suggests that educational practice
outside the exam schools could benefit from the presence in the system of
schools that cater to the needs of students who can be admitted into the exam
schools.165
Such a suggestion seems entirely plausible. De Blasio’s advisory council
in New York, for example, justified its recommendation to abolish screened
admissions not only on the grounds of fairness but on the grounds of
pedagogical imperatives it felt apply to “all” students:
Decades of research has taught us that diverse, integrated schools offer
academic and social benefits for all students . . . . (1) all students benefit
when they can learn from classmates who have different life experiences to
share, increased . . . creativity; (2) all students benefit from reductions in
prejudices and implicit biases and improved social-emotional well-being;
and (3) all students benefit from experiences that prepare them for an
increasingly diverse society.166

The exam schools offer a different pedagogical vision. It does not reject the
claims of the de Blasio committee, but it does reject the unvarying, universal
weight the committee assigns to them. The foundational understanding of
the exam schools elevates certain pedagogical values that the de Blasio
committee dramatically undervalues. By allowing exam schools to operate,
the totality of the City’s school system continues to carry both views as it
moves forward. This might, perhaps, lead both to more careful attention to
the differentiated needs of high-end learners in the non-test schools and to
the benefits of diverse classrooms in the test schools.
Gerken’s analysis also leads to the recognition that sacrificing some
influence for occasional control sounds not only in outcomes, or even in the
nature of school communities, but also in the nature of the individual
experiences of participating individuals. Second-order diversity, she writes:

164. Id.
165. See id. at 1157 n.162 (“Will an African American governed by a predominantly white
school committee be affected by the fact that elsewhere African Americans are setting
educational policy? Such a claim would, of course, raise a number of questions related to the
debates over virtual representation.”).
166. MAKING THE GRADE I, supra note 106, at 13–14.
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[D]istributes participatory experiences more symmetrically. It grants
electoral minorities a chance to enjoy the same type of participatory
experience — the sense of efficacy or agency associated with being in
charge — that is usually reserved for members of the majority. Instead of
being the junior partners to every decision, electoral minorities
occasionally enjoy . . . power . . . .167

Such occasional power at the school level carries benefits in terms of
political incorporation—those who have the experience of successfully
wielding power can use that experience to build more political power and to
gain elective office.168 There are also benefits beyond the instrumentally
political. The exercise of power has a “purely dignitary” dimension, because
it offers the experience of effective participation.169 It also operates as “a
sign of trust, an acknowledgment of equal status.”170 It is hard not to hear
the value these advantages carry in the protests of immigrant and poorer
communities, some Asian American but others as well, against the abolition
of the test schools. (It is easy and appropriate, of course, not to see these
advantages when the protests emanate from communities of wealth and
privilege whose dignity and status are assured).
Another of Gerken’s observations is about constituent service. In a
governance system characterized only by first-order diversity, those not in
the majority are essentially powerless to serve their constituents. Those
constituents benefit only when their interests track those of majorities.
Second-order diversity empowers representatives to serve their constituents
in some cases where constituent interests are opposed to the majority’s.171
In our context, schools themselves take on the role of representatives, as the
institution serving constituents. From that perspective, Gerken’s argument
tightly tracks many of the arguments for test schools made by those who
think that students with test-taking aptitude are benefited by environments
that place them among similar peers. The argument is not that most schools
should organize themselves to benefit this group specially, but rather that
overall utility might increase if a few schools do.
All of these benefits, however, require a system that is genuinely
characterized by second-order diversity. A jury or districting system

167. Gerken, supra note 21, at 1143. See generally Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order
Diversity: An Exploration of Decentralization’s Egalitarian Possibilities, in DIFFERENCE
WITHOUT DOMINATION: PURSUING JUSTICE IN DIVERSE DEMOCRACIES 227, 244 (Danielle Allen
& Rohini Somanathan eds., 2020).
168. See, e.g., Kim Geron & James S. Lai, Beyond Symbolic Representation: A
Comparison of the Electoral Pathways and Policy Priorities of Asian American and Latino
Elected Officials, 9 ASIAN L.J. 41, 61 (2002).
169. See Gerken, supra note 21, at 1143.
170. Id.
171. See id. at 1135.
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assumes many juries or districts. Second-order diversity means that some
juries will not be representative, but also that everyone is represented,
because each jury is drawn from a representative pool. The benefits that
Gerken notes — policy, political, discursive, and dignitary — require this
feature. And it is a feature that many school systems do not have. If a school
district offers the benefits of second-order diversity only to those who excel
on tests, without making it available to a variety of non-majority
communities, it is not engaged in second-order diversity at all. It is engaged
instead in favoritism, and, in the case of test-based admissions, favoritism
unavoidably inflected by race.
This same point can be appreciated by returning to the alternative frames
identified in Part II. If test schools are to be justified plausibly as exercises
in differentiating instruction, then the system must differentiate instruction
across the board, for children who test well but for other sorts of children
too. If the test schools are just a public contest, then the prize needs to be
relatively innocuous — which in part depends upon the test schools’ being
an idiosyncratic trophy and not the only educational game in town. Even if
test-school admission is a reward for “merit,” the care with which public
officials must define merit and the precision with which they must measure
it varies with the extent that that reward is valuable. Genuine second-order
diversity gives public authorities more justification to reward even
imperfectly measured traits, since the system is characterized by a plethora
of measurements and a multitude of rewards. Finally, to the extent that
admissions by exam are a species of pork barrel politics, such politics also
require that there be multiple recipients with multiple stakes in the system
jockeying for multiple rewards.
The various jurisdictions whose test schools (whether test-only or tests as
one important academic measure) have been at the forefront of controversy
— New York, San Francisco, Cambridge, and Fairfax, Virginia — embed
those schools in systems that display very different levels of second-order
diversity. The diversity of New York’s high school ecology, as noted, is
robust. Both San Francisco and Cambridge have systems of public-school
choice of which the test schools are a part, but the range and number of
choices is far more limited than in New York. The system in Fairfax
essentially offers Thomas Jefferson as a singular “elite” opt-out from regular
geographical assignment. These differences are not about the schools
themselves, but about the systems in which they participate. Nevertheless,
such differences should substantially shape the public assessment of the
reasonableness and desirability of the test-school approach, on any frame.
CONCLUSION
The examination school question is difficult because all sides are right.
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Certainly, the extraordinary racial disparities that result from exam-based
admissions are a tocsin warning that something is deeply amiss. Intuitively,
an exam full of questions about math and vocabulary, neutral on its face and
blindly administered, is an entirely legitimate way — and perhaps the fairest
achievable way — to identify students with vitally important traits of
intelligence, aptitude, diligence, and grit. Plausibly, it makes sense to
provide such students with a particular kind of intense education from which
they can benefit.172
It matters that, at a school like New York’s Stuyvesant, the principal
beneficiaries of the racial disparities associated with the exam are not white
students of privilege but Asian American students of poor and moderate
means. It matters that other schools in the New York system provide groups
of students defined by criteria other than strong test-taking abilities with
other kinds of specialized education, with different and perhaps even
complementary racial effects. And it matters that not all exam schools are
like Stuyvesant and not all school systems are like New York’s. 173
There is also a great deal that we just don’t know, both about the tests and
about ourselves. Do exam schools enjoy meaningful financial advantages
relative to other public schools? Does test preparation work, and how, and
for whom? What do the exams actually measure? What are we trying to
measure anyway?174 Can a school system be “common” and equitable but
still respond effectively to the extraordinary range of differences among
children, or are trade-offs between these two goals inevitable?175 If tradeoffs are unavoidable, how do we want to make them? Does concentrating
academically advanced students in a single institution even help them to
learn in the first place?
These claims and questions are about race, and they are about “merit.”
But they are not only about race and merit. They operate simultaneously on
different and disjunctive frames. Recognizing this is the only way for
productive debate to move forward. All interlocutors should acknowledge
that the exam school both reinforces structural racism for some groups and
mitigates it for others. It engages a problematic conception of value, but at
the same time differentiates instruction in a way we should want for all
children who differ from the norm. It generates a competitive struggle that
simultaneously elevates some important values in society, challenges other
important values, and generates a values-free, rough-and-tumble, pork-barrel

172.
173.
174.
175.

See supra Sections II.A and III.B.
See supra Section III.B.
See supra Section II.B.
See supra Sections II.C and II.D.
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scuffle among political constituencies. Its inequities are structural, and its
fairnesses are too.

